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Abstract: The impact of macroeconomic shocks, viz. rise in oil price on the sub-national 
wages of unorganized sector workers is little discussed in the literature. This paper uses 
three rounds of unit level data to show that moving from formal to informal facilities in 
the large transport sector in India is generally penalizing for the workers, albeit, higher 
educational qualification of the individual helps to raise real wages. Rise in oil price may 
lead to contraction of the informal transport sector owing to direct pass-through effects 
with varied sub-national welfare impact. Additionally, labor market reforms may increase 
wage of informal workers in the event of oil price shocks.  
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The implications of energy price shocks are varied. The developing and transition 
countries around the world have previously been negatively affected by the waves of oil-
price shocks much more than any other exogenous crisis of similar magnitudes. However, 
the global recession of 1973-75, 1978-80 and 1990-1993 caused predominantly by the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)-led high prices of crude oil have 
not recurred in the recent years despite its higher prices following the two Gulf wars. 
Instead, Nordhaus (2007) points out that output grew, unemployment fell and inflation 
remained moderate while cohabiting with oil-prices three times as high as that prevalent 
in the pre-war years. It is not automatic, however, that other sectors adjust quickly and 
favorably. During economic downturns, which might accompany an oil price shock, 
some sectors and some locations may be more affected than others (Fields 1988). How 
does the transport sector itself, especially those in the urban areas and their workers, cope 
with this? It is also important to inquire if the observed adjustments are outcomes of a 
more liberal regime and would have been negligible if India maintained the same policy 
structures as in the pre-reform era. We discuss briefly, how the previous attitude towards 
gradualist economic reforms allowed the country to maintain a relative stability even 
during the epitome of first generation reforms. Naturally, with lesser controls adopted by 
the government, the transfer of economic shocks would be direct. Under the 
circumstances, if the benefits of exposing the internal economies to external forces 
outweigh the costs, which may happen due to strong institutional characteristics of a 
country, then the subject remains wide open for empirical verifications.         
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This chapter explores the wage and employment conditions of transport sector 
workers in India, the larger proportion of which is engaged predominantly in the informal 
sector (ILO 1972; NCEUS 2007; Chaudhuri and Mukhopadhyay 2009; Marjit and Kar 
2011). Does the relatively high oil prices observed in the last few years (notwithstanding 
the all-time low prices in the last few months of 2015-16), affect the wages and 
employment of informal transport workers adversely? To the best of our knowledge, this 
question remains unanswered in the concerned literature. The flipside of the problem is 
that during historically low prices, should wages and employment of such workers then 
receive unprecedented impetus? The welfare implications of such impact on a sizable 
section of the labor force associated with transport services in developing countries is 
unmistakable. Presently, we address this question empirically by drawing on the primary 
survey data available from the National Sample Survey of India and offer a general 
equilibrium model in order to generalize these results. The analytical section shows that 
the informal sector contracts and faces lower nominal and real wages when oil price rises. 
Interestingly, in our model the traded sectors expand and leave the effect of oil price 
shock on national income, ambiguous. We are nonetheless aware of the fact that the 
sectoral or regional impact on the income of the poor may be quite deterministic as many 
of them depend on urban transport. This has been distinctly taken up earlier by Glaeser, 
Kahn and Rappaport (2008).  
Indeed, the impact of oil price shock as a trigger for economic crisis is much more 
common for countries that use lesser administrative controls internally. India, for 
example, practiced price control on essential items including petroleum since 
independence even going a few years into the economic reforms of 1990s. The gradualist 
 4 
approach to economic reforms that India adopted over a sustained period of time helped 
internal adjustments much better than rapid transitions into uncharted territories that 
disrupted economic and social circumstances in more recent times. Importantly, India 
also practiced managed float exchange rate system during the early reforms and had not 
allowed a full convertibility of the capital accounts. Both of these required continuous 
monitoring and intervention by the central bank. In fact, the economic reforms of the 
1990s not only raised economic growth to an unprecedented level, but it also managed to 
maintain relative economic stability - of course, not without the costs that any reform 
brings about. The government control on capital account has been especially favorable 
for protecting India from the Asian financial crisis (See Marjit and Kar, 1998). Unlike, 
the East and South-East Asian countries allowing short-term foreign portfolio 
investments to leave the countries at short notices thus bringing about the crisis, India 
preferred long-term foreign investments and disallowed dollar-for-dollar repatriation to 
the source. In other words, India used several monetary and fiscal instruments to insulate 
itself from various external sources of crisis, and even a globally spread out oil-price rise 
would make a limited impact owing to partial pass-through on to the local markets.                                  
In addition, it is argued that the ‘Great Moderation’ in macroeconomic shocks 
consequent primarily on reduced volatility is the driving force behind this unexpected 
non-crisis. Some of the earlier contributions (viz. Nordhaus 2007; Segal 2011) suggest 
that the oil price shocks have fairly limited impact on the growth and distribution in most 
countries, because the earlier tradition of reorienting the monetary policy to allow dollar-
to-dollar pass through of oil price shocks have of late been replaced. In fact, the usual 
monetary policy response to oil price pass-through had so far been a rise in the interest 
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rate, which in turn slowed growth.  In recent times, the reactions from the central banks 
have been moderate in the face of oil price shocks because the monetary policy seems to 
be more concerned with core inflation, which excludes the energy component. 
Nevertheless, possible impact in sectors directly dependent on consumption of oil can 
hardly be ignored. The price of crude oil increased in India from USD 32.37 in April 
2004 to 132.47 in July 2008. It fell sharply for six months following that and rose to USD 
123.67 in March 2012 (see Figure 1 in Appendix 1). This upward trend continued till 
August 2013 and since then the oil price has started falling significantly and stayed at 
USD 40 mark in March 2016 (see Figure 2 in Appendix 1).    
To reiterate, the extant literature, dealing with energy prices and sectoral 
readjustments, does not discuss the pass through of oil prices on to wages, viz. in the 
domestic transport services. The transport services we deal with in the empirical section 
include both formal and informal activities. This seems to be an appropriate depiction of 
the range of activities in the transport sector in developing countries and is also 
formalized in the generalized model we develop next. We categorically estimate the wage 
impact of switching from the formal to the informal sector – a plausible feature of this 
labor market associated with rising oil prices. The presence of urban informal sector has 
several implications associated with use of fuel and impact on environment, largely 
because they are often outside the monitoring circuit of the local governments (Kahn and 
Pfaff 2000). While we discuss the scope in detail shortly, to clear any confusion 
presently, the idea is to observe if the formal transport fails to cope with rising oil prices 
and contracts employment, leading to relocation of workers to the informal sector. Does 
it lead to a definitive fall in real wages when workers move from the formal to the 
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informal transport services? This is what we estimate, with rising oil price as the source 
of change. We accommodate a number of other variables to substantiate this effect 
calculated between 2004-05 and 2011-12.
1
 The fall in real wage of transport workers is a 
testable proposition because the switch from formal to informal also implies that the 
service provider would no longer have to bear the ‘institutional costs’ (including 
adherence to labor laws, environmental strictures, various taxes, etc.) of running formal 
services and therefore, the workers need not necessarily settle for a lower real wage.
2
 In 
the related literature, Radchenko (2014) offers an interesting technique to identify the 
heterogeneity of labor markets in poor countries. The proposition that the displaced lose 
out is similar in spirit to the 'movers and stayers' hypothesis in Davidson and Matusz 
(2006).     
In section 2 we offer the data and scope of the empirical investigation. In section 
3 we determine the impact of oil price rise on the wages of workers that switch jobs, and 
section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Empirical Observations      
                                                 
1
 It is unfortunate that the data and report of the NSSO on Unorganized Enterprise Survey was published 
after this chapter was completed. Importantly, the data is unlikely to display considerable changes since it 
was collected within one year of the term of the government formed in 2014, and would have shown 
substantial fall in employment and wages if the survey covered the period of demonetization in November 
2016. Nevertheless, we have included some indicators of the transport sector enterprises and employment 
over the two rounds, below.     
2
 See, ‘Man with a Van’ written by John Tierney, New York Times Magazine, August 10, 1997 and 
reproduced in Economics: Principles and Applications, (Ch. 15, Monopoly) by G. Mankiw (2007), 
Cengage Publishing. According to this article the state council of New York prevents private van operators 
from running transport services, simply by declining their licenses. The state transport service maintains a 
monopoly (veiled under the pretext that private van operators are more accident prone owing to 
competition for passengers) and charges a higher price by disallowing private operators, who nonetheless 
operate informally in specific locations, such as the ‘curbs’ near shopping centers. Here informal operation 
is synonymous with illegal operations. The developing countries like India on the other hand have 
institutionalized private informal service providers and the status of such facilities is not necessarily illegal. 
Also see Rizzo (2011) for Tanzania.        
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 Data and Methodology 
This section investigates the impact of sectoral mobility of workers on the real 
wage. Based on the National Industry Code (NIC1998; 2004; 2008) classification we can 
broadly divide employment in the transport sector in India into 4 categories (at the 4-digit 
level). Since the classifications changed from one year to another, they were not 
comparable. Therefore, we used concordance tables to convert them all into the latest 
NIC classification.
3
 In addition, the classifications are further disaggregated depending 
on whether they are formal or informal. We consider a broader definition of the term 
‘formal’ sector that employs more than 10 people. We focus on the real wage of the 
road–transport industry worker. Our analysis leaves out railways transport since Indian 
Railways is still fully under the public sector. The categories of interest are therefore, 
‘urban or suburban passenger land transport – formal (USF)’, ‘urban or suburban 
passenger land transport –informal (USI)’, ‘other passenger land transport – formal 
(OF)’, ‘other passenger land transport – informal (OI)’, ‘freight transport by road – 
formal (FF)’ and ‘freight transport by road – informal (FI)’. Dependence of these sectors 
on fossil fuel and diesel is very high. Given these categories, we investigate the wage 
response when workers from the urban or suburban passenger land transport (formal) 
potentially move to any of the other five categories. 
The data is collected from two major sources for calculation of our dependent 
variable (real wage). We have collected information on nominal wage of the transport 
sector workers from the latest Employment Unemployment Surveys of the National 
                                                 
3
 To make the NIC-1998 and NIC-2004 comparable with NIC-2008 we have transferred some 
industries based on their four digit classification from one broad group to another or isolated them 
to form a new group as per the latest classification with the help of the concordance tables 
published by Central Statistical Organisation (CSO) of the Government of India.   
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Sample Survey Organization (NSSO). It is the primary source of data on various 
indicators of labor force at national and state level and provides vast set of information on 
each individual of the households selected in the sample. First, we identify individuals 





 (2009-10) and 68
th 
(2011-12) round surveys on employment unemployment 
using NSSO usual principal activity status, respectively. In order to calculate the real 
wage of these workers (nominal wage deflated by the price level of the corresponding 
year), information on the price level has been collected from the All India Price Index 
(General) for Industrial Workers (CPIIW, Base-1982=100) of the Labor Bureau of the 
Government of India. Further, we have collected information on age, sex, highest levels 
of completed education of individual workers, and area of residence (rural or urban) from 
the same source as mentioned earlier. Before testing empirical association, we offer a 
framework, which enables us to shed some light on the methodology we have adopted. 
To briefly apprise on the subsequent information on transport and communication 
services as available from the 73
rd
 round of sample survey by the NSSO (see footnote 1), 
we present Table I below. The table clearly shows that between 2011-12 and 2015-16, 
both the number of enterprises engaged with transport and communication belonging to 
the unorganized sector, and the employment of workers in such organizations, fell. 
Indeed, the direction of change corroborates our findings further, even though these 







Table I: Changes in the Number of Enterprises and Number of Workers in 
the Transport and Communication Services between 2011-12 and 2015-16 
Industrial 
sector








workers ('000) 4027 3602 7628 4003 3521 7524 -0.6 -2.2 -1.4
67th Round: 2011-12 73rd Round: 2015-16 Growth Rate
Source: NSS Report No.581: Operational Characteristics of Unincorporated Non-Agricultural Enterprises (Excluding Construction) in India
 
          We have considered three land transport industries with their formal-informal 
divisions. There are 3,294, 2936, and 3,070 observations in the sample for workers who 
belong to these transport sectors according to the three rounds specified above. We 
provide a descriptive analysis on the distribution of the workers for these industries with 
respect to their levels of education and age groups in Appendix I. We also provide 
summary statistics on the daily wage rate of these workers. The analysis is done for rural 
and urban areas, separately, in order to understand regional variation in the possible 
outcomes. The reason behind this is also direct. The rural to urban migration is the well-
known progenitor of the vast informal sector in the urban space of the developing world 
in general (see Harris and Todaro, 1970 and several works thereafter). The rural sector 
itself also has a large informal counterpart, and the low productivity of agricultural 
workers is primarily responsible for such outcomes. Thus, if the wage of informal 
transport workers in the urban area (as one form of informal jobs) is adversely affected 
 10 
by an external factor, but the rural informal worker is differently affected, the migration 
pattern and consequently the wages may also respond to that.    
Most of the rural transport workers are concentrated in informal sector of ‘Freight 
transport industry’ followed by ‘Other passenger land transport’. This is also true for 
urban sample and for all the rounds we have considered. Table A1 gives the distribution 
of the workers in these six different industries with respect to their levels of education. 
Three major columns are representative of the three NSS rounds. We find that with 
education up to the secondary level, the transport workers are more likely to be in the 
informal sectors of these two sub-sectors. The percentage concentration of these workers 
in these sub-sectors has in fact increased over the last two rounds. For higher levels of 
education, participation in the formal sector of Urban or suburban passenger land 
transport rises irrespective of the residential area. However, for education level of twelfth 
standard and above the concentration in this sector falls between the 61
st
 and the 66
th
 
round, but increases thereafter. 
We have also grouped the transport industry workers according to their age 
groups into three cohorts, Youth (15-29), Adult (30-49) and Elderly (50 and above), 
respectively. Table A2 shows that youth transport workers are mostly concentrated in the 
informal sector of ‘Freight transport by road’ followed by the informal sector of the 
‘Other passenger land transport’ industry. Concentration in the formal sector of the urban 
or sub-urban is highest among the older cohorts. However, in case of the formal sectors 
of the other two industries, participation is very low and almost similar among the 3 age 
cohorts. This in general is true for the three NSS rounds and for both the areas. 
 11 
Table A3 offers the daily wage distribution of these workers for the rural and 
urban areas, separately. We see that the transport industry wage is positively skewed. The 
variation in the wage rate is higher for the rural areas compared to their urban 
counterparts and it has also increased over the consecutive rounds. However, after 
deflating the wage by CPIIW, the variance falls. Subsequently, we take the log 
transformation of the real wage and obtain a normal distribution amenable to empirical 
investigation.  
 
3. Empirical Analysis 
 Ordinary Least Square (OLS) Specifications 
  We aim to investigate empirically how different informal and formal transport 
service providing sectors influence change in the prevailing real wage when workers 
switch sectors.  
   (I) 
Equation (I) is the conventional Mincer equation, which estimates the wage rate with 
inclusion of standard variables like age, age squared (measuring experience), levels of 
education, etc. represents real wage of i
th
 worker in the transport industry. 
 is a categorical variable, which can be represented by a dummy. It can 
assume 6 categories depending on the sectors (formal/informal) we have classified 
earlier. The first one (USF) is treated as our base category.  Therefore   measures the 
effect of movement from the base to the j
th 
category by the i
th  
individual, on the real 
wage.  
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Depending on the highest level of education, we convert education into a 
categorical variable also. The categories are ‘no elementary education’, ‘primary 
education (up to)’, ‘secondary education (up to)’, ‘higher secondary education’ and 
‘tertiary education (more than twelfth standard)', respectively. The coefficient  
measures the impact of movement from no elementary (our base category) education to 
k
th
 level on the real wage. In order to take into account local labor market conditions, we 
have controlled for the district specific heterogeneities. measures district-
specific fixed effect. Finally,  is the error term. The estimation has been considered for 
rural and urban areas separately and for three different time points (2004-05, 2009-10 and 
2011-12). Interestingly, the high crude oil prices reported for India largely coincides with 
the rounds under consideration (Figure 1, Appendix 1). Table 1 contains the result of the 
OLS estimation. There are three major columns and sub columns corresponding to three 
different time points and the areas of residences respectively. 
Table 1 here 
 Table 1 offers a number of noteworthy features. First, regardless of what sector a 
formal transport worker moves into during the period when the crude oil prices were 
high, the real wage outcome is usually negative and significant. This implies that change 
of sector has largely been unrewarding for the workers in the transport sector, unless the 
education level cushions the potential fall in real wage. Indeed, even workers with some 
education received the benefit of education while moving between the formal sector 
(USF) and any other sector. Education above twelfth standard leads to an almost 40% 
gain in real wage if the worker relocates from the USF to any city-based transport service 
facility. However, it may not be enough to reverse the strong negative effects arising 
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from spread and depth of such activities in various cities and towns of India. The fall in 




 rounds were generally larger compared to the 
67
th
 round. Movement of workers from the formal to the urban informal affects wages by 
a larger magnitude in more recent rounds. However, if the worker moved from USF to 
another formal sector in the rural area, the loss of real wage is stronger as compared to 
moving into the urban area in the same sub-sector (OF). If the worker moves to other 
informal sector, the fall in real wage is rather high for both rural and urban areas. It seems 
that on the one hand, the lack of opportunities in the rural areas for transport sector 
workers could be a potential reason for causing a steep decline in the real wage, and on 
the other hand, oversupply of such workers in the urban area is responsible for an almost 
equivalent fall in real wage. It is expected that most such workers are male and therefore 
sex has a weak impact on the observed change, although the age factor seems to have 
positive impact on the real wage in the earlier rounds, but the effect has dampened in the 
68
th
 round. More experience on the job still cannot reverse the loss in real wage 
completely, but the effect of job switching becomes rather small. The results are 
supported by adequate goodness of fit for the econometric model.  
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
 This paper dealt with the wage response of a typical transport worker in a 
developing country that allows cohabitation of both formal and informal modes of 
transport. The underlying source of change in this paper arises from the international oil 
prices. It has been duly argued in the macroeconomics literature that the rising oil prices 
coexist with growth in most economies in the recent times and does not cause the 
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economic crises observed in previous decades. The alignment of international oil prices 
with domestic prices without artificial buffers and the non-interference of monetary 
policy to counter oil price shocks have led to such outcomes in most countries. The 
literature does not, however, discuss other ensuing adjustments, namely those in the 
factor markets. This paper showed through an empirical exercise and an analytical model 
closely resembling the developing country structure that oil price rise is quite likely to 
affect the wages of the transport sector workers, negatively. In the empirical section, it 
was showed that the negative effect on workers wage is a result of potential mobility of 
such workers from the formal to the informal sub-sectors within the transport sector at 
large. The workers nevertheless get the benefit of educational capital when they might be 
forced to move from formal sector to informal sector due to looming job losses following 
steep rise in the oil prices, which the formal transport sector often cannot cope with due 
to other institutional inflexibilities. Notwithstanding, the possibility of wage loss is still 
rather compelling for transport workers in India. The three rounds of survey under 
consideration strictly coincided with the periods of high oil prices prevailing in India. 
Indeed, the co-existence of high oil prices, high inflation and reasonable 
economic growth could be a realistic feature of the developing economies, although in 
terms of the internal readjustments, the wage of workers seems to bear a disproportionate 
burden of the negative impacts. Clearly, more research is needed to understand if the 
initial negative adjustments faced by the workers turn into permanent disadvantages for a 
large mass of population. The relationship with poverty and inequality is almost integral 
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 Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban 
Variables Real wage Real wage Real wage Real wage Real wage Real wage 
       
USI -0.698*** -0.686*** -0.444*** -0.617*** -0.425*** -0.469*** 
 (0.073) (0.075) (0.099) (0.100) (0.074) (0.075) 
OF -0.396*** -0.256*** -0.117 -0.333*** -0.358*** -0.144* 
 (0.103) (0.085) (0.104) (0.097) (0.083) (0.083) 
OI -0.824*** -0.718*** -0.598*** -0.725*** -0.633*** -0.552*** 
 (0.060) (0.057) (0.072) (0.076) (0.059) (0.065) 
FF -0.582*** -0.508*** -0.509*** -0.576*** -0.566*** -0.299*** 
 (0.081) (0.074) (0.094) (0.088) (0.0790 (0.083) 
FI -0.786*** -0.689*** -0.559*** -0.664*** -0.572*** -0.536*** 
 (0.057) (0.054) (0.072) (0.075) (0.057) (0.065) 
Age 0.0629*** 0.0629*** 0.0427*** 0.0653*** 0.0207** 0.0350*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) 
Age 2 -0.00064*** -0.000637*** -0.000439*** -0.000698*** -0.000123 -0.00031*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Sex -0.318* -0.428*** -0.369*** -0.229 -0.390*** -0.0619 
 (0.168) (0.123) (0.112) (0.142) (0.137) (0.195) 
Primary 0.172*** 0.0719 0.0832* 0.121** -0.0920** -0.00283 
 (0.042) (0.046) (0.047) (0.059) (0.044) (0.057) 
Secondary 0.219*** 0.218*** 0.145*** 0.300*** 0.0739** 0.0962** 
 (0.037) (0.038) (0.041) (0.047) (0.036) (0.046) 
Higher secondary 
(HS)   
0.276*** 0.418*** 0.251*** 0.334*** 0.133** 0.272*** 
 (0.067) (0.066) (0.068) (0.071) (0.056) (0.067) 
More than HS 0.257*** 0.543*** 0.322*** 0.581*** 0.223*** 0.436*** 
 (0.079) (0.066) (0.082) (0.0809) (0.074) (0.0713) 
      (0.507) 
Constant -1.770*** -2.331*** -1.993*** -2.293*** -1.597*** -2.141*** 
 (0.535) (0.513) (0.528) (0.452) (0.514) (0.302) 
       
Observations 1,738 1,556 1,667 1,269 1,696 1,374 
R-squared 0.601 0.636 0.513 0.610 0.563 0.575 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 






































Mean Median SD Skewness Kurtosis
Rural wage 1738 99 79 76 3 27
realwage 1738 0.189 0.150 0.145 3.379 26.878
log_realwage 1738 -1.883 -1.899 0.660 -0.107 3.843
Urban wage 1556 115.634 85.714 94.839 2.822 17.308
realwage 1556 0.220 0.163 0.181 2.822 17.308
log_realwage 1556 -1.754 -1.812 0.677 0.222 3.318
66th
Rural wage 1667 153.825 128.571 106.028 2.854 15.929
realwage 1667 0.200 0.167 0.138 2.854 15.929
log_realwage 1667 -1.788 -1.791 0.590 -0.135 4.448
Urban wage 1269 176.615 142.857 147.520 4.227 34.420
realwage 1269 0.229 0.185 0.191 4.227 34.420
log_realwage 1269 -1.693 -1.686 0.642 0.133 4.044
68th
Rural wage 1696 214.8079 178.5714 141.4818 2.164318 9.163108
realwage 1696 0.23 0.19 0.15 2.16 9.16
log_realwage 1696 -1.63 -1.65 0.58 -0.03 3.98
Urban wage 1374 243.39 200.00 210.48 5.02 47.89
realwage 1374 0.26 0.22 0.23 5.02 47.89
log_realwage 1374 -1.55 -1.53 0.63 0.14 4.70  






















Source: World Bank 
 
 
